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Regional Human Rights Systems
African Systems
Case in African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights Challenges
Barrier to Individual Complainants
In a case against the African Union
currently pending before the African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the
Court is under pressure to clearly establish whether it has jurisdiction to hear
cases brought by individual complainants regardless of whether the challenged
State Party or international organization
has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.
In Atabong Denis Atemnkeng v. African
Union, a Cameroonian employee of the
African Union Commission seeks a declaration that Article 34(6) of the Protocol to
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights on the Establishment of an African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights is
contrary to the Constitutive Act (the Act)
of the African Union, and to Articles 2, 3,
and 7 of the African Charter. Article 34(6)
requires that a challenged State acknowledge the Court’s jurisdiction before an individual’s case can proceed against it under
Article 5(3). Atemnkeng argues that this
requirement is inconsistent with Articles 2,
3, and 7, which guarantee equal enjoyment
of the rights found in the Charter, equality
before the law, and the right to have one’s
cause heard, respectively.
If the Court upholds the validity of
Article 34(6), the Court may effectively
deny individuals the right to have their
causes heard in violation of Article 7.
While individuals can currently bring cases
before the African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights, Atemnkeng alleges he
was denied the justice he sought through
the Commission. Furthermore, because
Cameroon has not permitted the Court
to receive individual complaints against
it, Atemnkeng is barred from bringing
a case against the country in the Court.
Therefore, Atemnkeng has brought this
case against the African Union (AU) to ask
the Court to find Article 34(6) invalid, providing Atemnkeng, and other individuals,
an alternative venue in which to receive justice for human rights violations by States.

The African Court issued an opinion
in July 2012 in a case that also challenged the validity of Article 34(6). In
Femi Falana v. African Union, the Court
did not rule on the validity of 34(6) itself,
but rather applied it to find that the Court
lacked jurisdiction. The Court concluded
that an individual complaint against the
AU, a non-state entity that had not made
a declaration pursuant to 34(6), was outside the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction.
Additionally, the Court concluded that the
AU cannot be sued in the Court because,
while the AU has separate legal personality, it is not a party to the Protocol.
The dissent, however, did find that the
African Union could be sued because in
addition to being a separate legal entity,
organs of the AU can request advisory
opinions of the Court. The dissent argued
that Article 34(6) is contrary to the Charter
because the Protocol, under Article 66 of
the Charter, is meant to supplement the
Charter in protecting and promoting human
rights, but 34(6) instead effectively prevents
the Court from addressing human rights
abuses. However, the dissent determined
that the Court did not have the authority to
declare the Article null and void.
In light of the Falana decision, it is
still uncertain how the Court will decide
Atemnkeng’s case. With two new judges on
the Court, Ben Kioko and El Hadji Guissé,
it is possible that a majority could agree
with the dissent in Falana and find that
Article 34(6) is contrary to the Charter and
individual complainants cannot be barred
under it. While Kioko and Guissé both
replaced judges who sided with the majority in Falana, the possibility of a change
appears unlikely considering that Kioko, in
his previous role as Legal Counsel for the
African Union Commission, represented
the AU in Falana.
At stake in Atemnkeng is a clear establishment of the Court’s jurisdiction and
individual complainants’ ability to challenge human rights abuses in the Court.
Individuals can currently bring cases to the
Commission, but as Atemnkeng alleges,
this avenue does not always provide justice
for individuals. Unlike the Court’s rulings,
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decisions of the Commission are not binding, and while the Commission can recommend individual cases to the Court,
bypassing Article 34(6), it is often slow to
deal with cases causing individuals to wait
years. Without a direct venue in which to
address human rights abuses, individuals
in the forty-nine states that have not made
a declaration accepting jurisdiction under
Article 34(6) do not have equal access to
justice. Furthermore, if the Court decides
that the AU cannot be sued because it is
not a party to the Protocol, as the majority
decided in Falana, stakeholders will not
be able to hold the AU accountable for its
actions or inaction in protecting and promoting human rights.

ECOWAS Community Court of
Justice Focuses on Effective
Implementation
In an effort to combat an estimated
sixty percent noncompliance rate with
the decisions of the Community Court of
Justice (ECCJ), the adjudicatory body of
the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), ECOWAS announced
a new focus on effective implementation of ECCJ decisions for its new legal
year, which began in September 2012.
Individuals who seek redress for human
rights violations in the ECCJ do not necessarily receive justice with a final ruling from the court; the State Party needs
to take steps to carry out the decision.
For example, in Musa Saidykhan v. The
Gambia in 2010, the ECCJ ruled in favor
of a tortured journalist, granting damages and finding violations of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(African Charter) under Article 5, prohibition against torture; Article 6, the right to
personal liberty; and Article 7, the right
to a fair trial. Gambia has yet to make the
necessary declarations or pay restitution as
ordered by the Court.
The Chief Registrar of the ECCJ, Tony
Anene-Maido, credits the unwillingness
of Member States to comply with ECCJ
decisions as the source of the lack of
confidence in the Court. Adding to the
issue is the effect of noncompliance in
other Subregional Economic Communities
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(SECs), which adds to ECCJ Member
States’ worries over the ECCJ’s effectiveness. The Southern African Development
Community (SADC) Tribunal was suspended after Zimbabwe refused to comply
with its decision that found Zimbabwe’s
land reform program discriminatory in
violation of the SADC Treaty. While the
Tribunal is suspended, its previous decisions
are also suspended. With this background
demonstrating the possibility of a similar
fate for other SECs, Member States have
expressed doubt regarding the effectiveness
of the ECCJ.
The work of the States in developing
implementation mechanisms is a crucial
element in the ECCJ’s ability to protect
human rights in the region. Originally
designed to interpret the ECOWAS
Treaty and hear contentious cases brought
by Member States and institutions on
Community Law, the ECCJ now also hears
cases brought by individuals on contentious
issues, including human rights violations,
since the passage of the 2005 Supplementary
Protocol to the Treaty. The ECCJ applies
international human rights treaties that
have been ratified by the States Parties,
including the African Charter, which all
fifteen ECOWAS Member States have
ratified. However, the ECCJ depends on
national implementation mechanisms set
up in accordance with Article 24 of the
Supplementary Protocol. Three states have
complied with Article 24: the Republic of
Niger, Nigeria, and the Republic of Guinea.
However, even those States with a national
mechanism in place have not uniformly
enforced all of the ECCJ’s decisions.
ECOWAS, as a SEC, overlaps with
the jurisdiction of the African Union, the
pan-African international organization that
provides complainants alternative forums
in which to bring their case. All ECOWAS
States Parties are subject to the jurisdiction
of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (the Commission), and nine
of the fifteen ECOWAS Member States
have ratified the protocol establishing the
African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights (the Court). There are certain factors that may make the ECCJ a more favorable venue for an individual complainant.
Individuals cannot bring their cases before
the Court unless their State has agreed to
its jurisdiction, and the Commission can be
slow to hear complaints. Further, exhaustion of local remedies is a requirement of
the Court and the Commission but not the

ECCJ. Finally, while the Commission and
the Court implement the African Charter,
the ECCJ implements the African Charter
as well as other international human rights
instruments ratified by the State involved.
The ongoing lack of implementation
by State Parties makes the new focus on
implementation crucial. Nigeria announced
in June 2011 the new position of Minister
of Justice as the national authority charged
with implementation of ECCJ decisions,
but Nigeria has yet to effectively utilize
the mechanism. If Member States still
do not implement ECCJ judgments, even
with national implementation mechanisms
in place, future complainants may not
have the confidence to utilize the ECCJ.
Furthermore, States that do not implement
ECCJ decisions deny past complainants,
like Musa Saidykhan, the remedies promised to them. Complainants can still turn to
the Commission or the Court, but they may
be effectively barred from those organs if
their state has not accepted jurisdiction of
the Court or their complaint is grounded in
an international document other than the
African Charter.
Brittany West, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human
Rights Brief.

European System
ECtHR Becomes the First
International Court to Rule
on CIA Rendition Program
The Grand Chamber of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on
December 13, 2012, found Macedonia
liable for Khaled El-Masri’s torture and
other violations in a case connected to
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s
(CIA) program of extraordinary rendition.
In 2003, Macedonian intelligence agents
apprehended and detained El-Masri before
handing him over to the CIA, the Court
found. Nine years later, in May 2012,
El-Masri filed the complaint to the ECtHR
alleging unlawful abduction and mistreatment by the Macedonian Ministry of the
Interior. The case, El-Masri v. The former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, marked
the first time an international human rights
court considered the merits of a claim
related to the participation of a European
state in the U.S.-led renditions program.
The decision by the Grand Chamber
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of the ECtHR found Macedonia liable for
violations of the European Convention on
Human Rights’ (ECHR) Article 3 (torture
and inhuman or degrading treatment) for
two counts, Article 5 (liberty and security),
Article 8 (respect for private and family
life), and Article 13 (effective remedy).
More broadly, the decision added jurisprudence on the scope and extent of state
responsibility under the ECHR for involvement in extraordinary renditions carried
out by states not party to the Convention.
El-Masri, a German national of
Lebanese descent, asserted in his petition
that Macedonia held and interrogated
him for twenty-three days before handing
him over to the CIA for interrogation in
Afghanistan concerning suspected links
to al-Qaida. He claimed that the CIA
detained him “incommunicado” with no
communication to the outside for more
than four months until setting him free in
Albania after the CIA determined El-Masri
had been confused with a similarly named
terrorism suspect.
The Grand Chamber found Macedonia
liable on all charges brought by El-Masri.
The first count under Article 3 relates
not just to his inhuman treatment during
detention by the Macedonian government,
but also for the further risk Macedonia put
him under by releasing him to the CIA.
The court significantly held the case was
not just important for El-Masri but for
other victims of similar crimes and found a
second violation of Article 3 for the State’s
failure to adequately investigate.
The ECtHR previously ruled in Osman
v. United Kingdom, that a state is responsible when it “knew or ought to have known”
that there was a real and immediate risk
to rights protected by the ECHR, and
the State failed to “take measures within
the scope of [its] powers.” The ECtHR
in El-Masri’s case likewise determined
that Macedonia “knew or ought to have
known” because the reports of the actions
of the CIA, which the Court stated were
manifestly contrary to the ECHR, were
known at the time.
In addition to Article 3 violations, the
Court found that El-Masri’s twenty-threeday detention by Macedonian authorities
along with his transfer to CIA agents violated his Article 5 ECHR right to liberty
and security of person. Section 2 of Article
5 allows only lawful arrest or detention,
prohibiting secret and arbitrary detention
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and disappearance. The Court found that
he was outside the legal framework during his detention, had no access to any
court where he could challenge his detention, and it should have been clear to the
Macedonian authorities that he faced a risk
of violation of his rights by the CIA.

Assisted Reproduction violated the right
to privacy by creating inconsistent and disproportionate interference in the applicants’
lives by denying them access to embryo
screening but authorizing medically assisted
termination of pregnancy when the fetus
showed symptoms of the same disease.

The Court also found that El-Masri
had been denied respect for his private and
family life during the time of his detention and that, in conjunction with all the
other violations, there had been a violation of Article 13 because there had been
no effective criminal investigation, which
consequently also burdened his ability
to seek civil remedies. Article 13 of the
ECHR provides a right to effective remedy
in national courts for violations of ECHR
rights. The remedy required by Article 13
must be effective in practice as well as in
law, particularly in the sense that its exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered by
the acts or omissions of the authorities of
the respondent state.

With the help of in vitro fertilization
and genetic screening, the applicants, both
carriers of cystic fibrosis, wanted to avoid
transmitting the disease to their offspring.
Because the Italian law prohibits preimplantation diagnosis, their only option
was to conceive and medically terminate it
if the fetus tested positive for the disease.
The couple argued that not being able
to access genetic screening to select an
embryo unaffected by the disease was a
violation of Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR.

The Court’s decision was a significant
finding on the legal remedies for the
ECHR States Parties’ involvement in the
U.S.-led renditions program. Despite any
tension it might cause with the United
States, the Court made clear its disapproval
of State Party’s involvement with the CIA
program and was especially critical of the
lack of investigation because it hindered
both other victims and what the Court
considered the general public’s right to
know what happened. In a complex case
involving the “War on Terror” and delicate interactions among nations, the Court
found the rights of the individual must
still be honored. Individuals have thus far
struggled to bring successful challenges in
U.S. courts or any other arena against the
U.S. government, but the Court’s decision
creates an option that, at least when ECHR
States Parties are involved, there may be a
viable option for legal challenges.

Italy’s embryo screening ban
breached couple’s right to privacy
The European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) delivered its judgment in the
bioethics case of Costa and Pavan v. Italy,
holding the State responsible for violating
Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) by prohibiting
pre-natal diagnosis of genetic diseases.
The ECtHR found in its August 10, 2012,
decision that the Italian Law on Human

Article 8 of the ECHR offers general
protection of a person’s private and family
life, home, and correspondence against
arbitrary interference by the State. Section
2 of Article 8 specifies that public authority cannot interfere with this right unless
it “is in accordance with the law and is
necessary . . . for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.” The Italian
government did not dispute that the law fell
within the scope of Article 8; however, it
argued that the ban legitimately intervened
to protect the health of mother and child,
the doctor’s conscience, and the public
interest to prevent eugenic selection.
In its ruling against Italy, the Court
highlighted “the incoherence of the Italian
legislative system that only bans the
implantation of healthy embryos while
allowing the abortion of fetuses with
genetic conditions” and found the law
disproportionate, in breach of Article 8 of
the ECHR. The ruling is consistent with
a previous decision by the Court in S.H.
v. Austria upholding a law prohibiting in
vitro fertilization, on the grounds that there
was no European consensus to consider it
a protected human right, but the decision
allowed for an exception, as was found
in the Costa and Pavan case, where the
public interests do not outweigh the private
ones. Also like in the S.H. case, the Court
in Costa and Pavan declined to enter into
bioethical issues and instead restated the
importance of proportionality.
The Court found in 2007 that the right
of a couple to make use of in vitro fertilization to conceive a child can be protected
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by Article 8 as an expression of private
and family life. The case concerned two
Austrian couples who wanted to conceive
a child through in vitro fertilization but
where denied access by Austrian Law.
Costa and Pavan v. Italy broadened the
scope of private and family life provided
protection under Article 8 by including
the desire to have a child born healthy and
without genetically transmissible diseases.
By identifying the parents’ wish with their
right to privacy, the Court projected the
concept of Article 8 as a right of individual
will in social order. Thus, the desire to
have a child free from disease constitutes
an aspect of the right to privacy granted
by Article 8. The Court held the notion
of “private life” to be a broad concept
inclusive of the right to respect for one’s
decision to have or not to have a child.
Furthermore, the Court observed that the
terms “child” and “embryo” must not
be confused, opposing the government’s
argument that the ban legitimately intervened to protect the health of the child.
Accordingly, to avoid any deviation in the
field of eugenics and to protect the freedom of conscience of medical personnel,
the term “child” would not apply.
The majority of European countries
allow some form of in vitro fertilization to
avoid the inheritance of genetic diseases.
Twelve European countries have yet to
establish laws regulating in vitro fertilization. The Court’s decision in this case sets
binding precedent for all Council of Europe
members. Although the Court has taken
a stand on the relevance of reproductive
medicine to the protection of private and
family life, it remains unclear how in vitro
fertilization can or should be protected by
the European Human Rights System.
Antonia Latsch, an L.L.M. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for The
Human Rights Brief

Inter-American System
Venezuela Seeks to Withdraw
from the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights
After months of speculation, Venezuela
has taken a decisive move to cut ties
with the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACtHR) by withdrawing from the
American Convention on Human Rights
(American Convention). On September
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6, 2012, Venezuela formally notified the
Secretary General of the Organization of
American States (OAS) of its intent to withdraw. Venezuelan officials have accused the
Court of acting as a puppet to United States
interests and of meddling with Venezuela’s
national sovereignty. Recent decisions by
both the IACtHR and the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
drew derision from Venezuela.
In July, Venezuelan President Hugo
Chávez reiterated statements made a few
months earlier that the country would withdraw after the Court issued a decision
in Díaz Peña v. Venezuela that required
Venezuela provide compensation for the
inhumane detention of Raúl José Díaz
Peña. That same month, the Commission
sent another case to the Court, Hermanos
Landaeta Mejías v. Venezuela, citing
Venezuela’s failure to comply with its recommendation that the alleged arbitrary
detention and extrajudicial killings of
the Mejías brothers be fully investigated.
Through its reports, the Commission has
expressed concern about political intolerance, restriction of free speech, impunity
for human rights violations, and has highlighted the Venezuelan government’s reluctance to allow the Commission to conduct
observation visits for the past ten years.
Most recently, the IACHR urged Venezuela
to investigate reports of a massacre of the
Yanomami indigenous people last year by
illegal Brazilian miners inside Venezuelan
borders. One day later Venezuela formally
notified the OAS of its intent to withdraw
from the Convention.
The IACtHR provides the last recourse
of judicial review in the Inter-American
System for violations of human rights by
states in the Americas region. In order to
be bound by IACtHR decisions, a State
must first ratify the American Convention
and then, pursuant to Article 62 of the
American Convention, declare that it recognizes the Court’s decisions as binding. Venezuela ratified the American
Convention in 1977 and declared intent
to be bound by the IACtHR’s jurisdiction
in 1981. Once the Court’s jurisdiction
has been recognized, only denouncing the
entire American Convention can remove
the State from the IACtHR’s reach. To
denounce the American Convention and
the Court’s jurisdiction, Article 78 of the

Convention requires countries to submit
official notification to the OAS of their
withdrawal one year in advance. Thus,
Venezuela is required to abide by the
Court’s decisions until the staying period
expires. During this time, the Court can
continue to receive and hear cases, and
any case pending at the end of the year will
continue its proceedings.
Even after a State Party denounces the
American Convention, the Commission
can still monitor human rights in that
country if the State is a party to the
American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man. Under the current model,
if Venezuela fails to comply with findings,
the Commission retains the option to forward a case to the Court to put additional
pressure on a State that has failed to adhere
to its human rights obligations. Moving
forward, the Commission will be able to
hear individual petitions against Venezuela
for human rights abuses; however, there
will no longer be a legally binding mechanism to uphold decisions against it. The
only way Venezuela could completely
remove itself from the Inter-American
Human Rights System would be to formally withdraw from OAS membership;
thus far Chávez has denied he will do this.
Venezuela’s decision elicited concern
among human rights advocates, including a regional coalition of civil society
organizations that called on Venezuela to
reconsider. In a joint statement they wrote,
“The potential withdrawal of Venezuela
would severely undermine the protection
of human rights in this country, and would
eliminate the last recourse to justice available to those who have suffered human
rights abuses.” An additional concern is
whether Venezuela’s actions may encourage other States to reconsider their own
ratification of the Convention and the
Court’s jurisdiction. Ecuador has also
openly threatened withdrawal. To date,
Trinidad and Tobago is the only State to
ratify, and then completely withdraw from
the Convention. Other countries, such as
Peru, began the formal withdrawal process
and then reversed the decision when a
new administration took office. Whether
Venezuela will reevaluate and uphold the
importance of human rights bodies in the
Americas remains to be seen. For the next
year, the collective system remains intact.
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Human Rights Court Hands
Another Victory to Indigenous
and Tribal Communities
From the Belo Monte dam in Brazil,
the Yanacocha gold mine in Peru, and oil
exploration activities in the Ecuadorian
Amazon, the rights of indigenous and
tribal peoples stand in sharp contrast
with the often pro-development stances
of national governments in the Americas
that grant concessions and allow corporations to build, dig, and drill. In June
2012, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACtHR) reaffirmed in Kichwa
Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador
that States must engage in prior consultation with indigenous communities before a
project begins on their ancestral lands.
In the 1990s, Ecuador granted a concession for oil exploration in Block 23
of the Amazon to PetroEcuador, the state
petroleum company, and CGC (Compañía
General de Combustibles S.A.), an
Argentinian oil company. The Kichwa
community of Sarayaku, numbering 1,200
people, whose territory covers two-thirds
of Block 23, alleged that it was never consulted and that the community continually
opposed the oil-related activities.
Seeking redress for the lack of consent, in 2003 the Sarayaku community
submitted a petition to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).
An important element of the complaint
was the introduction of explosives on and
below their land for seismic testing. The
Commission requested provisional measures to protect the community, which the
Court granted. When Ecuador failed to
implement the measures, the Commission
submitted the merits case to the IACtHR.
For the first time in its history, the Court
sent a delegation of representatives to the
affected community in Sarayaku to gather
additional information and held an in situ
proceeding. Secretary for Legal Affairs
of the Presidency of Ecuador, Dr. Alexis
Mera, acknowledged full state responsibility for the lack of consultation and offered
to compensate the Sarayaku community.
Ruling in favor of the Sarayaku, the
Court cited violations by Ecuador of the
American Convention on Human Rights
(Convention). The Court pointed to violations of the right to prior consultation, the
right to communal property, the right to
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life, the right to humane treatment, and the
right to an effective remedy. In its decision the Court cited International Labor
Organization (ILO) Convention 169,
which addresses the rights of indigenous
and tribal peoples and to which Ecuador
is a party. It also noted that Ecuador’s
constitution recognizes the right to prior
consultation and establishes that affected
communities should share in earned profits and receive compensation for cultural
and environmental damages. The Court
specified that consultation should occur
prior to the project beginning, that the
state must make a good faith effort to
obtain consent, and that consultation procedures must be adequate and accessible
to the particular community. In addition,
the Court ruled that the required environmental impact assessment in Sarayaku
failed to gather input from the community,
was not independent from the oil company,
and failed to take into account social,
spiritual, and cultural effects of oil activities on the Sarayaku. The Court ordered
Ecuador to ensure the explosives, which
are still underground and pose a potential

threat to community members, are deactivated. Additionally, the Court ordered
that Ecuador legislate a clear law on consent, pay damages to the community, and
ensure effective consultation procedures.
The Court was careful in saying that
Sarayaku did not place an outright ban on
development activities on indigenous land;
rather, the decision focused on the lack of
proper prior consultation and linked other
violated rights to this lack of exchange
with the community.
The Sarayaku decision came five years
after another pro-indigenous and tribal
rights decision by the Court in Saramaka
People v. Suriname. In Saramaka, the
Court considered whether a tribal or indigenous group was entitled to collective title
of its property and, if so, whether the State
must ensure it has the community’s consent
before granting concessions to develop the
natural resources located within its territory. The Court ruled that there is a strong
link between a tribal or indigenous community and the land and natural resources
that secure its survival. Thus, because the

Saramaka people traditionally harvested
and sold timber, a concession for logging could not be granted to a third party
until the community gave free, prior, and
informed consent.
The two decisions are especially important as governments throughout the region
wrestle with a pro-development and investment agenda, and the rights of indigenous and tribal communities. Saramaka
set a broad stage for indigenous rights and
explicitly linked the impact of industry on
a community’s rights, environment, cultural wellbeing, and livelihood, thus requiring prior consultation and consent from a
community. In Sarayaku the Court’s opinion rested on Saramaka, but focused on the
lack of proper prior consultation. While
both decisions give a boost to indigenous
rights, their full effect is still unraveling in
Ecuador and Suriname alike.
Jessica Alatorre, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human
Rights Brief.

Summer Law Program in The Hague 2013
Now Accepting Applications for the
7 Annual Summer Law Program in The Hague
Join us for this rare opportunity to learn and live in
the heart of the international justice community.
Examine critical issues of international criminal law
and international legal approaches to terrorism
while spending a month in the “International City
of Peace and Justice” among the practitioners,
courts, and tribunals making history today.

June 2013
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Eligibility
The program is open to full-time and part-time
J.D. candidates who have completed one year of
study, graduate degree candidates (LL.M.), and
practicing lawyers. Graduate students in other
disciplines may also be eligible.
Program Tuition
The Program tuition is $10,200, which is the cost
of six (6) law school credits.
Apply online:
www.wcl.american.edu/hague
Questions?

202-274-4067 or hagueprogram@wcl.american.edu

Academics:
All participants enroll in two three-credit courses:
 International Criminal Law: In Search of
Accountability, and
 International Legal Approaches to Terrorism in the
21st Century.
Site Visits
Integral to the academic program are site visits to
major international institutions, including:
 International Criminal Court
 International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia
 Special Tribunal for Lebanon
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